Methodological Notes:

• There are 3 main question that we aim to answer in this dashboard:

1. How does the voting information look on proposal #362?
2. Is there too much vote changing behavior?
3. how does the proposal #362 stand against other recent proposals in these terms?

• I included proposals with IDs greater than 350 which makes for total 16 proposals.
• In case we are exploring time dependent variables, I included the period between Nov 8th to Nov 22nd to account for some days before and after start and end of proposal (initiated at Nov 14th and ended at Nov 19th).
• The Code for “Changing Behavior” Chart comes from this dashboard.
• To participated in Osmosis governance, one should stake OSMO first. So in exploring voters balance, Staked balance is more important since it shows their vote power.

Validators

Validators were less compliant with the proposal and more than 60% didn’t voted for ‘YES’.

Validators who have voter "‘YES'“ had more OSMO staked thus more voting power.

All validators had previously voted on other Osmosis proposals (meaning proposal couldn’t force inactive validators to vote)

Introduction

What is Osmosis?

==The new face of Cosmos IBC==

Osmosis is an AMM Structured blockchain build on Cosmos SDK. This means to interact with this the network you basically are interacting with a DEX DApp (Decentralized exchange application). Being the biggest DEX on cosmos, Osmosis is growing everyday with its simple UI and multi optional UX provision.

The ability to initiate custom pools is one of the winning cards of Osmosis which attracts many liquidity providers. Osmosis also is the magical portal between many cosmos chains and powers the true force of IBC goals. Apart from swapping tokens, and providing liquidity, you can transfer your tokens between cosmos chains.

Osmosis Main Application

What is the story behind Proposal #362?

Proposal #362 was a vote session to determine the future of OGP (Osmosis Grant Program).

Previously, Reverie as the head team running this program was receiving monthly fund to give to selected eligible applicants after reviewing their plans and capabilities. On the new proposal (Click here for full details), they asked for a 12 month renewal of the program and $70,000 a month in USDC, and 35,000 OSMO a month.

Those who disagreed with this proposal were questioning Reverie’s performance and qualification for this fund pointing to their defected procedures, lack of transparency and communications (See here for a detailed conversation).

As a result, the proposal updated to 55,000 USDC + 25,000 OSMO a month. Also some other determinant functions were included, like:

• Governance can cancel Reverie’s involvement with the OGP at any time during the contract.
• Frequent updates to the community, including a monthly report, frequent grantee updates and calls, a live grants dashboard, and more.

Methodology

Things you’ll find in this dashboard:

• Total & Daily Number of Votes & Voters on Proposal #362
• Total & Daily Number of Vote Options on Proposal #362
• Differences between Validator and Non-Validator Voters
• Daily amount of voters Osmo balance
• Analyzing voting behavior: Changing Votes
• Comparison of Proposal #362 and other recent proposals

SQL Tables:

I am using Flipside Crypto Database and application to render this analysis. I’ll be using below tables from Osmosis database:

• ==For general vote information==: osmosis.core.fact_governance_votes

• ==For validator addresses and names==:

  osmosis.core.dim_label where label_subtype = 'validator'

• ==For Staked daily balance==:

osmosis.core.fact_daily_balances where balance_type = ‘staked’

Change In Votes

The reward for this section goes to the dude with 17 change in Votes :grinning:

Top 3 paths for changing votes lead to ‘NO’ or ‘NO With VETO’ which means heated discussions mostly worked in the rejecting path pf proposal.

Validators who had changed their minds had way less OSMO staked thus much lower voting power. This is also true in case of Non-Validators

Non-Validators Staked balance changed significantly (decreased) during the vote period, meaning that if they voted before unstaking action, their voting power will be reduced.

Data & Analysis

There are nearly 2K More votes than unique voters. So hypothetically there can be maximum of ~ 8% users who had changed their votes (But it will be less since some users will change their opinion more than once).

Despite the heated discussions and strong objections, proposal #362 passed with good support.

Second day votes kind of determined the final result of vote, although the objections were more increasing in day 3 to the end of vote date.

Normalized chart shows this fact very obviously that competence were much closer in final 4 days of vote

Comparing Other Proposals

There were 5 cases among recent proposals that had more votes and more daily average votes and voters than proposal #362

In at least 3 cases, The ratio of Voter/votes is lower than proposal #362. which means there were proposals that had more changing votes, with proposal #353 being the most obvious one.

Average OSMO balance of voters for proposal #362 is greater than other proposals. which suggests more whales are included.

Proposal #362 has seen the most number of validators changing votes among all recent proposals.

Conclusions

• Changing votes happened between both validators and Non-validator voters. This wasn’t unprecedent among recent proposals but none of them had as much changing votes among validators as proposal #362 had.
• There is a significant difference between voting power of single voters and multi voters among both validators and Non-validators.
• Voters of proposal #362 had more average OSMO balance than any other proposals.
• Among multi voters, 2 is the popular vote number, and 17 is the most number of change in votes.
• Less than 5% of voters changed their mind, and they mostly turned against proposal and their starting opinion.
• Validators were less compliant with the proposal and more than 60% didn’t supported the proposal.