Summary

• This dashboard aims to look into the decentralization of the Osmosis ecosystem by focusing on Props 114, 196, and 337.
• The daily variation of the voting power of the top 66% of the active set validators (since Jul 2021) before proposals shows a rather increasing trend.
• The daily variation of the voting power of the top 66% of the active set validators (since Jul 2021) after proposal 114 adoption shows a rather decreasing trend.
• The daily variation of the voting power of the top 66% of the active set validators (since Jul 2021) after proposal 196 adoption shows a significantly increasing trend.
• The daily variation of the voting power of the top 66% of the active set validators (since Jul 2021) after proposal 337 adoption shows a significantly increasing trend.
• Variation of the voting power of the top 66% of the active set validators after t+30, t+60, and t+90 days after proposal 114 adoption is rather decreasing. This trend is significantly increasing after proposals 196 and 337 adoptions significantly.
• The power share distribution per validators rank is as follows:
  • Top 10 validators: 303.94 (62%)
  • Top 10 to 50 validators: 168.67 (34.4%)
  • Top +50 validators: 17.75 (3.62%)
• The daily variation of the Nakamoto coefficient (since Jul 2021) before proposals and after proposals adoptions (114, 196, and 337) shows a rather constant trend.
• Variation of the Nakamoto coefficient after t+30 days after each proposal adoption is rather constant.
• Variation of the Nakamoto coefficient after t+60 days after each proposal adoption is rather constant.
• Variation of the Nakamoto coefficient after t+90 days after proposal 114 adoption is rather decreasing.
• Variation of the Nakamoto coefficient after t+90 days after proposal 196 adoption is significantly increasing.
• Variation of the Nakamoto coefficient after t+90 days after proposal 337 adoption is at first decreasing significantly. But the trend is increasing overall.

Acknowledgment and supplementary Information

• I would like to show my sincere gratitude to the author of the following dashboard that helped me very much indeed to do my own analysis: *
• Author: NSA2000
• Twitter of the Author: @NSA2000C
• Discord of the Author: NSA2000#5651
• Data from FlipsideCrypto
• Link of this dashboard’s tweet:

This chart shows the daily variation of the voting power of the top 66% of the active set validators from Jul 2021 to the present time, before and after proposals.

• The daily variation of the voting power of the top 66% of the active set validators (since Jul 2021) before proposals shows a rather increasing trend.
• The daily variation of the voting power of the top 66% of the active set validators (since Jul 2021) after proposal 114 adoption shows a rather decreasing trend.
• The daily variation of the voting power of the top 66% of the active set validators (since Jul 2021) after proposal 196 adoption shows a significantly increasing trend.
• The daily variation of the voting power of the top 66% of the active set validators (since Jul 2021) after proposal 337 adoption shows a significantly increasing trend.

These charts show the effect of the proposals on the voting power of the top 66% changed after t+30, t+60, and t+90 days after each proposal.

• Variation of the voting power of the top 66% of the active set validators after t+30, t+60, and t+90 days after proposal 114 adoption is rather decreasing. This trend is significantly increasing after proposals 196 and 337 adoptions significantly.

This chart shows the power share distribution per validators rank.

• The power share distribution per validators rank is as follows:
  • Top 10 validators: 303.94 (62%)
  • Top 10 to 50 validators: 168.67 (34.4%)
  • Top +50 validators: 17.75 (3.62%)

This chart shows the daily variation of the Nakamoto coefficient from Jul 2021 to the present time, before and after proposals.

• The daily variation of the Nakamoto coefficient (since Jul 2021) before proposals and after proposals adoptions (114, 196, and 337) shows a rather constant trend.

This chart shows the effect of the proposals on the Nakamoto coefficient after t+30 days after each proposal.

• Variation of the Nakamoto coefficient after t+30 days after each proposal adoption is rather constant.

This chart shows the effect of the proposals on the Nakamoto coefficient after t+60 days after each proposal.

• Variation of the Nakamoto coefficient after t+60 days after each proposal adoption is rather constant.

Introduction

Osmosis is Layer-1, Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain built using the Cosmos SDK that has optimized its design to be a sandbox for automated market makers (AMMs). The chain enables developers to design and deploy customized AMMs by using its various modules and leveraging Osmosis' on-chain governance system. Osmosis' native token, OSMO, grants holders the right to vote on proposed network changes and earn rewards for helping secure the network. Its first application, also called Osmosis, is an AMM that features ATOM and OSMO as its initial base trading pairs.

The introduction of automated market makers (AMMs) ushered in a new era of crypto-economic utility and bonding curve applications. AMMs have become an essential element of DeFi infrastructure, and every new ecosystem must have an exchange with liquidity pools to support basic tokens swaps and the creation of supplementary financial products.

Osmosis is an AMM protocol created using the Cosmos SDK. The project was announced in October 2020 and launched on Jun. 19th, 2021. Its core developers include Sunny Aggarwal, Josh Lee, and Dev Ojha. Osmosis' vision is that rather than aiming for a one-size-fits-all strategy for AMMs and their liquidity pools, it could provide a sandbox for AMM development. The protocol enables developers to iterate on new, customized AMM designs by using the existing liquidity pools and modules already running on the network. It also features an on-chain governance system that allows each AMM pool's stakeholders (i.e. liquidity providers) to control and direct their pools.

Osmosis was the first Cosmos-based chain to popularize IBC transfers. IBC transfers had been available for several months before but there was little actual demand from the connected chains; therefore, the volume of IBC transfers was extremely low. Being the first AMM on Cosmos, Osmosis offered the ability to trade and earn rewards through liquidity provision. [] \n

Methodology

The following tables have been employed in order to obtain data in this analysis:

osmosis.core.fact_staking

osmosis.core.fact_governance_votes

osmosis.core.dim_vote_options

Aim of this dashboard:

This dashboard aims to look into the decentralization of the Osmosis ecosystem by focusing on Props 114, 196, and 337. For this purpose some governance metrics have been tracked in order to find:

• The effect of these proposals on the voting power of the top 66% of the active set validators changes and trends

• The effect of these proposals on the voting power of the top 66% changed after t+30, t+60 and t+90 days after each proposal

• The effect of these proposals on the distribution of the power share according to the validators’ rank

• The effect of these proposals on the Nakamoto Coefficient

This chart shows the effect of the proposals on the Nakamoto coefficient after t+90 days after each proposal.

• Variation of the Nakamoto coefficient after t+90 days after proposal 114 adoption is rather decreasing.
• Variation of the Nakamoto coefficient after t+90 days after proposal 196 adoption is significantly increasing.
• Variation of the Nakamoto coefficient after t+90 days after proposal 337 adoption is at first decreasing significantly. But the trend is increasing overall.